ABSTRACT Cloud and remote storage, which has become the preferred method for reducing the security risk and safeguarding our data, is widely used for backups or outsourcing. Thus, for effective utilization of data, it is desirable to perform keyword queries directly over the encrypted data. In the single-data owner architecture, it is common to use symmetric encryption cryptography and allows only the holder who has the secret key to create searchable ciphertexts and trapdoors. In the multi-data owner (MDO) architecture, the scheme uses asymmetric encryption cryptography and allows anyone to create searchable ciphertexts under the public key, while the corresponding private key creates the trapdoors. In the real world, the data come from different providers. Thus, the MDO architecture may meet more applications. However, the existing solutions, in the MDO architecture, do not guarantee security for the trapdoors and provide only linear time search. In this paper, we present a comprehensive study of searching over encrypted data in the MDO architecture, and we propose a novel scheme that supports the inverted index structure, complex search, and dynamic update. After extensive analysis and several experiments, the results indicate that our proposed method is both efficient and secure. We believe that this is the first work that achieves trapdoor security and logarithmic time pairing free search over encrypted data in the MDO architecture.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing has emerged as a successful and ubiquitous paradigm for service-oriented computing and deploying web applications. However, since the administrators, privileged users and malicious users with root or system rights have the full access rights to the server and data, we must encrypt the private and sensitive data before storing them in this untrusted server. The encrypted data, which is known as ''ciphertext'', are inaccessible without the correct key or password. The encryption of data will reduce the risks of essential data suffering the numerous painful consequences of a hack, breach, or leakage. However, this also removes all search capabilities at the same time. A universal solution is to download the entire encrypted data and decrypt them for the searching task. It is a waste of computation and communication resources. Therefore, directly enabling keyword search technology, called searchable encryption (SE), upon encrypted data is a desirable technique for the effective utilization of data.
After updating the data to the cloud server, data owners can launch a search query through the server by the SE scheme. It will allow this cloud server to search in encrypted data on behalf of the user without needing to know any information about the plaintext data. Depending on the single data owner (SDO) or multi data owners (MDO) architecture, the searchable encryption is suitable for both sharing and outsourcing.
In the SDO architecture, Song et al. [31] proposed the first SE scheme. Their method utilizes symmetric key algorithms and generates the searchable ciphertext and trapdoor only by the key holders. After this article, many researchers [13] - [17] , [20] - [22] , [26] , [32] - [34] have investigated searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) quite extensively. Then subsequently, Curtmola et al. [15] introduced their scheme that contains two new adversarial models, which are nonadaptive (IND-CKA1) model and adaptive (IND-CKA2) model, for searchable symmetric encryption. This scheme is widely used as the standard definitions for SSE to date. Both IND-CKA1 and IND-CKA2 security definitions contain security for trapdoors and guarantee that the trapdoors do not leak information about the keywords.
In the MDO architecture, the first SE scheme is provided by Boneh et al. [8] . They proposed a public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) scheme on the basis of asymmetric primitives. There are many research results about the searchable asymmetric encryption [1] , [3] , [4] , [8] - [10] , [19] , [23] , [29] , [35] (SAE) in the MDO architecture. However, those schemes are all probability algorithm. Thus they only support linear time search while it costs at least a pairing computation. Bellare et al. [5] proposed a security definition for deterministic encryption in the public key setting and permitted a fast (i.e., sub-linear, and in fact logarithmic, time) pairing free search while provably providing privacy that is as strong as possible subject to this fast search constraint. Deterministic encryption cannot be used in the MDO architecture because the public key of the user must not be public.
On the other hand, even if the adversaries are allowed to obtain trapdoors for any keywords, they should not have the capability to classify the two challenge keywords' encryptions. However, it does not guarantee the security of trapdoor while anyone can generate the index to distinguish two trapdoors.
In this paper, we explore the problem of efficient and provable security keyword search in the MDO architecture. Our SAE scheme achieves both index and trapdoor security. We involve the idea of deterministic encryption and get logarithmic time pairing free search.
We summarize our contributions as follows: 1) We believe that this is the first work that achieves trapdoor security and logarithm time pairing free search over encrypted data in the MDO architecture. 2) In contrast to previous public key encryption with keyword search, we introduce the key pair of the data owner in this algorithm and redefine the searchable asymmetric encryption. Additionally, we combine the IND-CKA2 and PK-CKA, then present the IND-PK-CKA secure definition which supports both index and trapdoor security. 3) Existing solutions, in the MDO architecture, provide only linear time search and the test algorithm need pairing computation. We introduce deterministic encryption to our scheme. Therefore the cloud server can quickly build and maintain a dynamic inverted index table that supports logarithmic time search. Otherwise, the test algorithm of our scheme needs no pairing computation but string comparing. Thus our scheme is practical. 4) We formalize, design, and implement our proposed method and an evaluation by real-world datasets.
The results of several experiments indicate that our scheme is efficient. We organize our paper as follows. Section II presents and discusses the related works. Section III presents the formulation of our problem as well as the preliminaries. Section IV describes our efficient and provable security searchable asymmetric encryption scheme. Then we offer a modified version scheme in Section V. In Section VI, we evaluate our proposed schemes through several user studies and experiments. We then conclude our paper with Section VII.
II. RELATED WORKS
In the SDO architecture, Song et al. [31] first introduced the notion of searchable symmetric encryption (SSE). Their method allows a single keyword search without indexing. That is, the server must traverse the entire document to find the result. Later, Goh [20] introduced the first notion of SSE security in their scheme, which defines the security for indexes as semantic security (indistinguishability) against adaptively chosen keyword attacks. Damiani et al. [16] built a B-tree and encrypted it with every tuple using conventional encryption. However, the B-tree traversal can now be performed only by executing a sequence of queries that retrieve tree nodes at progressively deeper level. Chang and Mitzenmacher [14] proposed a stronger version of IND1-CKA which is a new simulation-based IND-CKA definition. Unfortunately, pointed out by Curtmola et al. [15] , the formalization of the security notion that they proposed was incorrect. It can be satisfied by an insecure SSE scheme. Curtmola et al. [15] introduced two adversarial models for searchable encryption IND-CKA1 and IND-CKA2, and it is subsequently widely used as the standard definitions for SSE in later theses [13] , [32] - [34] .
Actually, Curtmola et al.'s scheme [15] is the first SSE scheme that builds the inverted index table to promote search efficiency. Based on [15] , more and more researchers [22] , [26] develop their secure, searchable indexes upon the inverted index. Cash et al. [12] presented a dynamic searchable encryption scheme that each document can be represented by a series of independent T-Sets. Yet, their work doesn't realize the multi-keyword search functionality.
In the MDO architecture, the first SE scheme is provided by Boneh et al. [8] . As mentioned above, public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) scheme based on asymmetric primitives was proposed by them. Abdalla et al. [1] pointed out people can translate any anonymous identity, that based on the encryption scheme [11] , to a PEKS scheme. And then, several researchers improved this construction later [3] , [4] , [9] , [19] .
However, since the public key usually generates the trapdoors, PEKS does not guarantee security for the trapdoors. Later, Baek et al. [3] and Rhee et al. [29] presented their modify schemes. Unfortunately, their trapdoor is still insecure in the sight of the cloud server. Boneh et al. [10] defined the notion of function-private security to protect the trapdoor, VOLUME 6, 2018 however it is limited on the large min-entropy trapdoor space as mentioned in Bellare et al.'s work [5] . Besides the PEKS mode, Liu et al. [24] proposed a secure multi-owner data sharing scheme (Mona) for dynamic groups in the cloud applications. According to their design, the scheme can achieve fine-grained access control and the revoked users will not be able to access the sharing data again once they are revoked. However, the scheme will easily suffer from the collusion attack by the revoked user and the cloud [35] . Kiayias et al. [23] presented a broadcast-based encryption solution to generate a distinct secret key for each user, so that every user can query the data with their own key. But, it will introduce a high overhead for recomputing and redistribution of new keys for the user revocation since the user secret keys are all derived from a master key [30] .
Since the deterministic encryption scheme does not involve randomness, it always generates the same encryption results for a given plaintext and key, even over separate executions of the encryption algorithm. Although its security is weaker than the scheme of probabilistic encryption, the searchable scheme of deterministic encryption is more efficient. Bellare et al. [5] introduced a new security definition for deterministic encryption in the public key setting. Their method is similar to the standard IND-CPA security definition. It requires that the plaintext should have a large min-entropy and is independent of the public key. Meanwhile, Amanatidis et al. [2] and Raykova et al. [28] provided their definition for deterministic security in a similar way, that is plaintexts also have large min-entropy. Since deterministic encryption provide efficient searchable schemes, many researchers [6] , [18] , [25] - [27] have investigated deterministic encryption quite extensively.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we formulate the efficiency and security problem of searchable asymmetric encryption (SAE) over cloud data that encrypted in the MDO architecture. We denote a document identity collection of keywords as an (inverted) index and an encryption (inverted) index as secure (inverted) index. Similarly, the trapdoor is an encrypted version of a keyword of a search. 
A. THREAT AND SYSTEM MODEL
In the system architecture, as shown in Fig.1 , there are multi data owners (MDO) and one user [8] . To share a group of documents to the target user over the cloud, the different data owners first establish the secure searchable (inverted) indexes for their documents. Then they upload their encrypted files along with the corresponding secure indexes to the cloud. If a user wants to search the records from the encrypted documents, during the process of query, she could submit the trapdoor, the encoded version of the search keyword, to the server firstly. After receiving the trapdoor, the cloud server performs a search algorithm through the secure indexes and returns the matched files as a search result to the user.
We should note that different from the single data owner (SDO) architecture [15] , in the MDO architecture there is no need to get the trapdoor via a secure channel from the data owner before the user search the target files. We always assume that there are O(d) data owners with average O(m) files, while there are O(n) keywords in every file.
Throughout this paper, we consider the adversaries are anyone except the data owners and user. The adversaries can get the secure index and trapdoor, and execute the search algorithm. Otherwise, the adversaries can ask for index and trapdoor of designated keywords. It should be noted that, before designing a searchable asymmetric encryption scheme, we modify the security definition deployed in the traditional SDO architecture to suit our MDO architecture. That is, except the results and the pattern of search queries, we can not disclose any information from the remote documents, index, and trapdoor. (will discuss in Section IV).
B. DESIGN GOAL
Under the model mentioned above, in order to achieve the efficient and secure keyword search over encrypted cloud data, our design goal is as follows: 1) Security guarantee: the objective of our scheme is to preserve the index and trapdoor privacy. That is, from the secure index and trapdoor, the adversary (anyone except the data owners and user) should not have the capability to deduce any keyword information of the file set beside the search result. Otherwise, the adversary should not be able to link two trapdoors from distinct data owner even if they are for the same keyword. And keyword privacy requires user accurately represents and securely encrypts the indexes and queries. 2) Efficiency search: to search a keyword in the files set, the traditional searchable asymmetric encryption (i.e., PEKS) need to execute the test algorithm O(dmn) times, and at least one pairing computation in once test. Our goal is to build the secure inverted index table and to permit a fast (i.e., sub-linear, and in fact logarithmic, time and pairing free) search while provably providing privacy.
C. NOTATIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
• W -the keywords space.
• D pub -the public key of the data owner.
• D priv -the private key of the data owner.
• U pub -the public key of the user.
• U priv -the private key of the user.
• I D,w -the secure index for keyword w ∈ W shared from the data owner.
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• T D,w -the secure trapdoor for keyword w ∈ W shared from the data owner.
• T w -the secure trapdoor for keyword w ∈ W. Bilinear Map: we recall the definition of bilinear maps by using the standard notation as follows [7] : 1) Let G 1 , G 2 and G T are cyclic groups of prime order p; 2) Let g 1 and g 2 are generators of G 1 and G 2 , respectively;
3) The map e : G 1 × G 2 → G T is a bilinear map. G 1 , G 2 and G T are all isomorphic to one another since they have the same order and are cyclic. If
And the group action in G, group G T and the bilinear map e : G × G → G T can be computed efficiently.
D. COMPLEXITY ASSUMPTION
Since the security proofs of our proposed schemes are based on the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH), we first review this problem which has been defined and assumed hard in the new bilinear context [7] , [8] .
The BDH problem is as follows: given a tuple g, g a , g b , g c ∈ G and compute e(g, g) abc ∈ G T . An algorithm A has advantage in solving BDH in G if
where the probability is over the random choice of a, b, c ∈ Z * p and random bits used by A. Definition 1: if no t−time algorithm can achieve advantage at least in deciding the BDH problem in G, we say that the (t, )−BDH assumption holds in G.
IV. EFFICIENT AND SECURITY SEARCHABLE ASYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION A. MAIN IDEA
To design efficient and security searchable asymmetric encryption scheme, we must satisfy three essential rules: first, encryption mechanism to build secure index and trapdoor; second, the deterministic inverted index table to improve the search efficiency, and third, we can integrate the efficient and secure mechanisms into the above two design choices. These three aspects are closely inter-related and largely determine the performance of the resulting search scheme.
Here, we discuss the main ideas of our proposed scheme for the first two aspects in the following. And more detailed information of our design, integrated efficient and security mechanisms, will be described in section IV-C.
The traditional searchable asymmetric encryption, like PEKS [8] , does not guarantee the security of the trapdoors. It is because the trapdoors are usually generated by using the user's public key. However, if the trapdoors are created only under the public key, it is impossible to get the indistinguishable security. Any adversary could generate the index using the public key, and execute the search algorithm to distinct the trapdoor.
To get the trapdoor security, we involve the data owner's private key in the secure index and the data owner's public key in the secure trapdoor. Thus, the adversary could not generate the secure index to distinct the trapdoor.
Presently, the typical method to achieve a sublinear search time is to use an inverted index, which is a keyword-index pair in the database. The search complexity can be reduced to O(log dm) (using a binary tree, for example). However, the traditional probabilistic encryption scheme is hard to build the inverted index table, since it is hard to sort the index and hard to link two indexes even if they are for the same keyword.
Following the deterministic encryption scheme, we always get the same ciphertext for a given plaintext and key since this scheme involves no randomness. The security definition for deterministic encryption that Bellare et al. [5] proposed in the public key setting is similar to the standard IND-CPA security definition except requiring that the large min-entropy plaintexts and independence between plaintext and public key. To design our scheme, we involve the idea of the deterministic secure index to build the inverted index table and the binary tree. Thus, our searchable asymmetric encryption scheme introduces a logarithm time search.
B. MODEL AND SECURITY DEFINITION
We present our model and security definition in this subsection. To share the data in the cloud securely, the data owner should build the security index under her private key and the receiver's (user's) public key. And at the same time, the security trapdoor should be generated under the data owner's public key and the receiver's (user's) private key.
SAE: The searchable asymmetric encryption (SAE) consists of five polynomial time algorithms, (Setup, KeyGen, BuildIndex, Trapdoor, Test), That is:
• Setup: It takes as input a security parameter and returns the system parameters.
• KeyGen: It is executed by the data owner and the user, to generate their corresponding public key and private key.
• BuildIndex: It is executed by the data owner, to generate the security indexes of keywords, under the data owner's private key D priv and the user's public key U pub .
• Trapdoor: It is executed by the user, to generate the security trapdoor of keywords, under the data owner's public key D pub and the user's private key U priv .
• Test: It is executed by the cloud server, to determine whether a security index and a security trapdoor point to the same keyword. The SAE model entirely meets the MDO architecture demands. Thus any data owner could security share the data with the user without the secure channel to transport trapdoor. VOLUME 6, 2018 We omit the real search algorithm instead of the test algorithm since the search algorithm is based on the test algorithm and the index structure.
Practically, a ciphertext has a form of
where Enc() is a secure public key encryption if we want to send a message m with keywords w 1 , w 2 , · · · , w m in the SAE scheme. While the cloud receives the ciphertext and index, it uses the index to build and maintain the (inverted) index table in order to promote the search efficiency. In this paper, we mainly focus on the searchable encryption part.
Security Definition: According to the Curtmola et al.'s research [15] , it is evident to us that the previous definitions are not suitable for SSE after reviewing the existing security definitions. There are inherent links between the security of indexes and that of the trapdoors. They introduce their scheme for searchable encryption that contains two new adversarial models which are nonadaptive that they call IND-CKA1 and adaptive adversarial model that they call IND-CKA2.
In the asymmetric (public key) setting, Boneh et al. [8] propose a indistinguishability security against the attacks of public key schemes under adaptively chosen keyword (PK-CKA). In the security definition, an adversary should not has the capability to classify the indexes of two challenge keywords of its choice even if she is allowed to obtain the indexes and trapdoors for any keyword.
In this article, we integrate both the IND-CKA2 and PK-CKA security definition, and present our IND-PK-CKA challenge game as follows:
• Initial: The challenge C takes the security parameter 1 l , and run Setup algorithm that mentioned in the Section IV.B to generate the system parameter. Then run KeyGen algorithm twice to create the public key and private key of data owner and the user. At last, the system parameter, the data owner's public key D pub and the user's public key U pub are given to the adversary A. The challenge C keeps the private key D priv and U priv that belongs to the data owner and the user, respectively.
• Phase 1: A adaptively queries a series of keywords • Challenge: A selects w 0 and w 1 as two target keywords, then, sends them to the challenger C. The only restriction is that these two target keywords w 0 and w 1 should not be queried in previous phases. The challenge C picks a random bit β ∈ {0, 1}, and afterwards it sets I D,w β = BuildIndex(D priv , U pub , w β ) and • Guess: Finally, the adversary A gives a guess β ∈ {0, 1}. If β = β, it wins the game We define the advantage of the adversary A against the challenge game as the function of the security parameter 1 l : 
C. SCHEME CONSTRUCTION
In this subsection, We describe our proposed scheme SAE-I in more detail. Our scheme is asymmetric in the MDO architecture and includes (Setup, KeyGen, BuildIndex, Trapdoor, Test), five polynomial time algorithms.
• Setup(1 l ): Given the security parameter 1 l , it generates G and G T of order N = p which determined by 1 l , and a bilinear map e : G × G → G T , pick g ← R G and selects three cryptographic one-way hash functions:
• KeyGen(A): User A random choose α ← R Z * p , and output the public key as A pub = g α and private key as A priv = α.
• BuildIndex(D priv = d,U pub = g u ,w): In order to generate the security asymmetric index of keyword w shared with U , the data owner D compute
and send it to the cloud.
• Trapdoor(D pub = g d ,U priv = u,w): In order to generate the security trapdoor of keyword w shared form D, the user U compute
• 
thus, I D ,w = T D,w .
FIGURE 2. SAE -I scheme. Discussion: Since our scheme is deterministic, it produces the same index and trapdoor for a given keyword, data owner and user. Otherwise, the index form is equal to the trapdoor. Therefore the cloud server could easily build and maintain the inverted index table (Table 1) as what we do on the plain text and index. Thus, the search algorithm will be every efficiency while it can make use of the binary tree build on the inverted index table and the single test need only string comparison.
To get the target file, the user should input the file source (the data owner's public key) and the keyword to generate the trapdoor, while the traditional search scheme only needs the keyword as input. Actually, this additional condition is not a chain but provide a more precise search. Always, we would like to get the ''urgent'' email from ''Bob'', or the ''Obama'' news from ''Google''. In section IV , we present a modified scheme SAE-II which is also a deterministic scheme but don't need the designed data owner's public key as the input of trapdoor algorithm.
More details about performance will be found in section V .
D. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We prove that our SAE-I scheme is IND-PK-CKA secure under the BDH assumption in the random oracle model. Proof: Assume that A is an adversary with advantage in breaking SAE-I against IND-PK-CKA and H (·), H T (·) are modeled as random oracles. Then we can construct an adversary B who attacks the BDH problem using A as described below.
• Initial: The BDH challenger gives the BDH parameters g, g a , g b , g c ∈ G to adversary B and ask for z = e (g, g) abc ∈ G T . First, B sets the system parameters as {G, G T , e, g, H , H T }. Then, B sets the data owner's public key as g a , and the user's public key as g b . H -queries: A issues at most q h queries to the random oracle. It simultaneously responds these queries.
Otherwise, it selects a random value h i ∈ Z * p which does not appear in H list . Then, it generator a random coin cn i {0, 1} so that
It adds {w i , h i , cn i , g i } to H list , and returns g i to A. H T -queries: A issues at most q h queries to the random oracle. It simultaneously responds these queries. 
is not in H list T , B then executes the H T − queries as above. At last, B responds h T ,i as the secure index and trapdoor of w i .
• Challenge: A selects two target keywords w 0 and w 1 , and sends them to the challenger B. First, B executes the H − queries. If the cn i corresponding to w 0 or w 1 is equal to 0, B then abort. Then, B selects a random coin β ∈ {0, 1}, and a random string h T ,β ∈ {0, 1} k . At last, B send < h T ,β , h T ,β > to the adversary A.
• Phase 2: A continues to issue index and trapdoor queries which are not equal to w 0 and w 1 . B responds as in Phase 1.
• Guess: Finally, A output it's guess β . If β = β, B first pick out the h β corresponding to w β , and random choose a g T ,β from H list T . At last, B output g 1/h β T ,β as the BDH answer. The BDH adversary B should not abort in Index Queries, Trapdoor Queries and Challenge phase for the success. The probability that it does not abort in Index Queries and Trapdoor Queries is (1 − . Therefore, the probability that B does not abort during the simulation is greater than Let H be the event that A issues a query for H T (e(g, H (w β )) ab ) at some point during the simulation above. In the real attack, if A never issues a query for H T (e(g, H (w β )) ab ) then the challenge index and trapdoor is independent of A's view (since H T (e(g, H (w β )) ab ) is independent of A's view). Therefore, in the real attack
Then, it follows that ≤ |Pr
. Hence, at the end of the simulation, e(g, H (w β )) ab appears in some tuple on the H list T with probability at least 2 . It follows that B produces the correct answer of BDH with probability at least
Here we complete the proof of the theorem.
V. MODIFY SEARCHABLE ASYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION
Here, we give a modify searchable asymmetric encryption scheme SAE-II which support keyword search without the designed sender.
• Setup(1 l ): Given 1 l , the security parameter, it generate two groups G and G T of order N = p which determined by 1 l , and a bilinear map e : G×G → G T , pick g ← R G and choose three cryptographic one-way hash functions: -H : {0, 1} * → G -H T : G T → {0, 1} w for some positive integer w. Publish the system parameters param =< G, G T , p, e, g, H , H T >.
• KeyGen(A): User A random choose a ← R Z * p , and output the public key as A pub = g a and private key as A priv = a.
• BuildIndex(D priv = d,U pub = g u ,w): In order to generate the security asymmetric index of keyword w shared with the user U , the data owner D compute
• Trapdoor(U priv = u,w): In order to generate the security trapdoor of keyword w, the user U compute
• Test(I D,w , T w ):
if so, output yes ; if not, output no .
Correctness: We have that
Since the trapdoor of SAE-II is generated without a designed data owner, an attacker can generate an index with a forge public key to test the trapdoor. Thus, SAE-II can not provide trapdoor security. However, the index of SAE-II is essentially equal to SAE-I (the different part of two indexes is just the data owner's public key, but in the security definition of SAE-I , the public key is transferred to the adversary), so it is secure as proved above.
Actually, SAE-II can be regarded as the specific determinate version of PEKS [8] ; it takes the data owner's private key as the random value of the secure index. However, it is different from the deterministic searchable encryption. In the deterministic searchable encryption, everyone could generate the same encryption of keyword. Hence, using the encryption function, the attacker can launch brute-force attacks by trying all possible plaintext-ciphertext pairs with the hope of eventually guessing correctly.
With SAE-II , the cloud server could build an semi-inverted index table (Table 2) . Once the cloud receives a new index I D,w = [S, C], it first recognizes the data owner from S, then inserts the index under the data owner and renew the binary tree under the data owner. Once the cloud receives the trapdoor, it first computes H T [e(S, T w )] for some data owner, then searches the binary tree under the data owner. 
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed schemes. We implement our scheme on a desktop PC equipped with Intel Core i7 4790K CPU at 4 GHz and 2 GB RAM. We use the Enron email corpus 1 as our dataset. The original data set contains 517,402 email files sent and received by 150 people. 2 We simulate the messages as the shared data in the cloud and consider the email senders as the multi data owners. After extracting the keywords for every file by Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency, or simply TF-IDF, we randomly select 300 data owners with more than 10,000 keywords. In Table 3 , we compare the deference of security and system architecture among SSE, PEKS, SAE-I and SAE-II . Actually, SAE-II can be PEKS regarded as the specific determinate version of PEKS.
In the Table 4 , we compare the performance of PEKS, SAE-I and SAE-II , since they are all in the MDO architecture. We always assume that there are O(d) data owners, and average own O(n) document with O(m) keywords in it.
In the BuildIndex and Trapdoor phase, PEKS, SAE-I and SAE-II have almost performance. However in the search phase, since the index and trap of SAE-I have the same form, the search algorithm is pairing free, and it needs only execute the string comparison on the inverted index table with a binary tree. While receiving a trapdoor, SAE-II need to compute a pairing with every data owner, then execute the string comparison on the semi-inverted index table with a binary tree. with the inverted index, SAE-I . Figure 3a and Figure 3b show that, in SAE-I , for the search time, there is a slight rise when the keywords or data owners increase. That means the influence of the keywords number or data owners number is not obvious. The time for building an index and generating trapdoor remains steady when the number of keywords or data owners changed.
From the Figure 3c , in SAE-II , it is clear that the efficiency of building an index, generating trapdoor and searching is not related to keyword growth when the number of users is the same. And as is illustrated by the Figure 3d , the efficiency of search presents a linear relationship with the number of data owners while the trapdoor and building index is of little change. The actual experiment corresponds to the theoretical analysis.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed our method to solve the challenging keyword search problem over the encryption data in the multi data owner architecture. Thus any data owner could security share the data with the user without the secure channel to transport trapdoor. We redefine the searchable asymmetric encryption while introducing the data owner's key pair. Simultaneously, we give the security definition combining the IND-CKA2 security definition proposed by Curtmola et al. and PK-CKA security definition proposed by Boneh et al. Our security definition provides both index and trapdoor security.
Actually, we proposed a scheme SAE-I in the MDO architecture that meets our definition. SAE-I is deterministic so the cloud server could build a dynamic inverted index table and provide O(log dm) time search.
Otherwise, we proposed another scheme SAE-II which can be regarded as the specific determinate version of PEKS, and it takes the data owner's private key as the random value of the secure index. With SAE-II , the cloud server could build a dynamic semi-inverted index and provide O(d log m) time search.
Through thorough analysis of the security and experiment by real-word dataset, we can safely conclude that our proposed method is both efficient and secure in practical applications. 
